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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation is a compilation of two essays addressing the effects of
economic factors on the quality of care in U.S. nursing homes. Both papers make used of
nationally representative data for 2010 on nursing homes in the U.S., state regulation of
long-term care providers, particularly Medicaid policy towards nursing homes, the
economic structure of local markets in which the facilities operate, including the extent of
competition from other long-term care providers, such as assisted living facilities and
home healthcare agencies, and county-level population demographic characteristics.
Over the last 20 years nursing homes in many markets across the U.S. have
experienced increased competition from home health agencies and assisted living
facilities, yet little is known about how these more recent sources of competition affect
the quality of care they provide. The first essay examines how nine different measures of
nursing home care quality respond to the greater levels of local market competition from
these alternative providers of long-term care, as well as other nursing homes. The
findings from this empirical analysis reveal that faced with greater competition from
assisted living facilities, nursing homes are left to care for more disabled, less healthy
patients. Although the nursing home’s staff-to-bed ratios rises in response, significant
declines occur in other measures of care quality, such as more process- and outcomebased measures. Competition from home health agencies likewise has mixed effects on
the nursing home’s care quality, and competition from other nursing homes in a market
tends to decrease care quality. These finding suggest that care quality in nursing homes
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may continue to erode as the market for alternative, community-based long-term care
services expands.
The second essay examines the important effects of state Medicaid regulations on
nursing home care quality. Unlike earlier studies on the effects of Medicaid, this analysis
adopts a richer model specification for care quality that controls for the economic
structure of the nursing home’s local market, as well as how the state regulates assisted
living facilities, who compete with nursing homes for residents. Most previous studies of
the effects of state Medicaid policies on care quality analyzed nursing homes in isolation,
ignoring the presence of nearby competitor firms, and how state regulation of assisted
living facilities might also affect care quality in nursing homes. The findings from the
analysis reveal that a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate leads to significant
improvements in nine distinct aspects of nursing home quality, while state certificate-ofneed programs for nursing homes lead to significant declines in several (but not all)
dimensions of care quality. A large presence of assisted living beds in a local market also
tends to reduce nursing home quality, and state regulations regarding assisted living
facilities indirectly affect nursing home care quality by altering the nature of local market
competition. Overall, these results suggest that state laws related to all long-term care
providers, not just nursing homes, are important determinants of nursing home care
quality.
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Chapter 2
Effects of Long-term Care Market Competition
on Nursing Home Quality

2.1 Introduction
Long-term care encompasses a broad range of services, including medical and
non-medical care provided to people who need assistance performing activities of daily
living. Current estimates suggest that at least 70 percent of individuals over age 65 will
need long-term care services at some point in their lifetime (CMS 2014). In 2010, total
spending for long-term care services was $207.9 billion, or 8 percent of all U.S. personal
health care spending (O’Shaughnessy 2011), most of which is paid by state Medicaid
programs.
Historically, nursing homes have been the major providers of long-term care to
older adults. In recent decades, however, alternatives to nursing homes have emerged in
many areas, such as assisted living facilities and home health care providers. Some states
have even begun to cover care in these alternative settings under Medicaid, by established
Medicaid 1915(C) waiver programs. With these changes in the structure of the market for
long-term care, and changes in Medicaid policy in some states, the overall demand for
nursing home care in the U.S. is also changing. More and more seniors are shifting away
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from receiving care in a nursing home to receiving home and community-based assisted
living care instead.
Assisted living facilities are community-based residential long term care centers
that provide housing and supportive services for older adults. Since 1990 the total number
of beds in assisted living facilities has grown rapidly. Nationwide the number of beds
more than doubled between 1990 and 2002 (Harrington et al 2001), and since then they
have continued to grow steadily. As of 2010 there were 51,367 licensed assisted living
facilities in the U.S. with a total bed capacity of 1,233,690 beds. Much different from the
earliest form, assisted living facilities are able to provide more professional medical care
and more services to assist activities of daily living. They are closer substitutes for
nursing home services than before.
Recent research suggests that many older adults have moved out from nursing
homes into assisted living facilities in order to achieve greater independence and more
dignity (Perkins et al 2012). There are now 1.8 million adults who live in this nation's
16,000 nursing homes (Kaye et al 2010), and more than 735,000 adults who live in
assisted living facilities (NSAL 2012). With their rapid growth rate, assisted living
facilities are expected to eventually surpass nursing homes to become the major providers
of long-term care services in the U.S..
Home care providers, which supply long-term care services at a patient’s home,
are also an important substitute for nursing home care. Studies have consistently found
that most older adults strongly prefer staying in their own home to any other alternative
(Gibson et al 2003).
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Despite the growing importance of home and community based services in longterm care, few studies have looked at whether and how home care providers and assisted
living facilities are affecting nursing homes. This is surprising because economics
suggests that nursing homes likely compete not only with other nursing homes, they
compete with other types of firms that provide alternatives to institutional care. This
implies that when a nursing home chooses care quality for its residents, for example, the
structure of the market in which it operates may be influencing its choices. With all the
competitive forces now shaping the long-term care market, we should not be examining
nursing homes in isolation from the rest of the market. If market competition is having
effects on nursing homes, then ignoring these effects could lead to biased results and
false conclusions.
This study examines how competition from nearby assisted living facilities and
home care providers affects the quality of care provided by nursing homes. Unlike the
few previous studies that addressed interactions between assisted living facilities and
nursing homes using state-specific data sets, this study analyzes data from a large,
nationwide sample of nursing homes. It is the first paper to study the effects of
competition from assisted living facilities and home health providers on the quality of
care within nursing homes. It also examines the effects of state-level regulations and
policies on nursing homes and assisted living facilities.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides background information on
the long-term care market and briefly reviews the literature on nursing home quality.
Section 2 describes the data used for the analysis and the specification of variables, while
Section 3 describes the statistical methods used. The results are reported in Section 4.
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Section 5 summarizes the key findings and their policy implications, and describes
possible future work.

2.2 Background
With the growing population of older adults and forthcoming wave of baby
boomers, long-term care has been a heated topic among health economists. Being the
major provider of long-term care, nursing homes have typically been the center of
discussion. Early studies, including Chiswick(1975), Scanlon(1980), and Mukamel et
al(2002), focused on the demand for nursing home services and the price elasticities for
care, trying to figure out what factors influence the demand function, in order to have a
clearer view of how this market operates. Since 2000 researchers have began to focus
more on nursing home quality, investigating how state regulations and facility
characteristics influence nursing home quality. Although it is difficult to measure quality
directly, a whole host of quality measures have been proposed. Zimmerman et al. (1995)
suggested quality measures in twelve different domains, discussed their nature and
characteristics, and examined their validation using a pilot test. On the other side of the
equation, factors from all sorts of aspects are being used to check their effects on nursing
home quality.
Facility characteristics, including for-profit status, have been evaluated by
Grabowski et al (2003). Their study found that a higher non-profit market share could
induce a spillover to the for-profit side of the nursing home market and thereby increase
overall quality in a market. This finding is consistent with a review done by Hillmer et al
(2005) that found that studies conducted between 1990 and 2002 on the relationship
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between nursing home for-profit status and quality of care collectively suggest that nonprofit nursing homes provide better quality, measured in many important areas, and the
quality difference between for-profit and non-profit nursing homes are systematic.
Harrington et al. (2001) also concluded that investor-owned nursing homes have worse
residents’ health outcomes than do non-profit homes.
Another line of literature focused on the effects of Medicaid reimbursement rates
on nursing home care quality. Cohen and Spector(1996) studied the effects of both the
reimbursement method and the Medicaid payment rate in their analysis. They found that
both affect nursing home staffing intensity. With the direct link of staffing intensity to
nursing home residents’ health outcomes, a higher level of reimbursement rate could
increase the staffing level that induces a possible quality increase.
David Grabowski has conducted several studies on the effects of Medicaid
payment rates. In a 2001 study he found the reimbursement rate had a small positive
effect on nursing home quality, as measured by the proportion of residents with facilityacquired pressure sores as well as the number of registered nurses. In another study based
on longitudinal data, Grabowski (2004) found uniformly positive effects on several
nursing home quality indicators with an increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate.
This improvement in the strength of the latter analysis is not only attributed to a better
model setting, but also to the incorporation of the market competition and changes over
time. In fact, competition in the nursing home sector can be a really important factor that
influences the interaction between nursing home characteristics and quality outcomes.
Zinn(1994) uses market share concentration in terms of Herfindahl index to indicate
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competition and finds there are significantly lower prevalence of catheter, restraint use,
and not toileted in markets with higher concentration.
Since 1990 there have been significant changes in the long-term care market with
the emergence of substitutes for nursing home care. More research is needed examining
the effects of the new market structures. The effect of competition on nursing home
quality is not as straight forward as the effect of competition on price to see through
based on economic theories. Morrisey (2001) pointed out two possible circumstances in
which competition might drive quality into completely different directions. On one hand,
if quality is related to more services being provided, a lower price caused by competition
might tend to bring down quality. On the other hand, if competition leads to greater
efficiency and cost savings, quality might rise. These two opposite possibilities call for
more evidence based on empirical work.
To date, only a few studies have considered the effects of assisted living facilities
on nursing home care quality. Competition from home care agencies has only been
addressed crudely with home health staff per capita and percentage of women aged15-64
not in the workforce as proxies. (Zinn 1994). Grunier et al (2007) is one of the few who
pay attention to assisted living facilities. By mainly looking at the dementia special care
units in nursing homes, they find that competition from assisted living facilities only
affected the profile of residents in special care units but not nursing home investment or
other aspects. Bowblis (2012) checked the effect from both nursing home market
structure and expansion of assisted living on nursing home quality using data in Ohio
state. His regression results show that assisted living facilities do have significant, mainly
negative, effects on nursing home quality. Although this study is only based on data in
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one state, these effects give a good sketch of the long-term care market interaction in
Ohio state and suggest a more integrated regulation method for assisted living facilities
and it also provides strong empirical evidences and supports to include competition from
other sectors in nursing home quality analysis in the future research.
The present study is the first to consider how the quality of nursing home care
responds empirically to local market competition from assisted living facilities, home
care agencies, as well as other nursing homes. Using nationally representative data from a
large sample of nursing homes observed in 2010, two questions are examined. First, is
the quality of care provided by a nursing home influenced by local market competition
from these three types of firms, and if so, how? Second, is the competition from assisted
living facility and home care agency taking the form of a battle over price or services?

2.3 Data Sources
Nursing home-level, county-level, and state-level data from several sources were
assembled to conduct the analysis. The data sources include the 2010 Certification And
Survey Provider Enhanced Reports (CASPER), the 2010 Nursing Home Compare (NHC)
data, the Provider of Services File (POS), the Area Resource File (ARF), the MetLife
Market Survey of Nursing Homes data, the Assisted Living, Adult Day Services, and
Home Care Costs (MetLife Market Survey) data, the State Data Book on Long Term
Care (State Data Book), the Assisted Living State Regulatory Review (AL Regulatory
Review), and assisted living facility supply data collected by Stevenson and Grawboski
(2010).
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The facility level nursing home data are from the CASPER and NHC data sets.
The CASPER data set replaced the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR)
System, and is maintained by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
This data set provides comprehensive information for every Medicare or Medicaid
certified nursing home facility with its operational characteristics and aggregate resident
information. The CASPER data was merged at the facility-level with the Nursing Home
Compare data, which provides information on the quality of care at the nursing home, as
reported by the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS).
Because our interest centers on the effects of competition between nursing homes,
home care agencies, and assisted living facilities, nursing homes that were certified as a
skilled nursing facility (SNF) only were dropped from the sample of facilities to be
analyzed. The care provided by SNFs is much more intense nursing care, and it is not a
substitute for the intermediate-level care provided by home care agencies and assisted
living facilities. Dropping the SNF-only facilities leads the total number of observations
to decrease by 9.44%, from 14827 to 13426. Without any further sampling, this data set
is a near-complete census of all the non-SNF certified nursing homes in the U.S. in 2010.
Several variables such as the staffing level per bed, the total number of health
deficiencies, the percentage of empty beds in the county, a Herfindahl index, and casemix measurement were all calculated for each facility using the data sets listed above.
The staffing level was calculated as full-time-equivalent staff per bed, defined as the sum
of full-time staff, part-time staff (upon conversion into full-time-equivalent persons), and
contract staff (upon conversion into full-time-equivalent persons). The percentage of
empty beds was derived from the difference between the total number of resident and
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total number of certified nursing home beds for each facility as a percentage of the total
number of beds, and then averaged at the county level where the nursing home was
located. The Herfindahl index was calculated at the county-level and is based on each
facility’s share of beds, defined as the number of beds in that nursing home divided by
the total number of beds in that facility’s county.
Data from the Provider of Service file, which provides information on all certified
health care institutional providers across the U.S., and the assisted living facility supply
data collected by Stevenson and Grabowski were merged with the nursing home facility
file based on each nursing home’s zip code. The assisted living data collected by
Stevenson and Grabowski describes assisted living facilities across the entire U.S., as of
2007. Before merging their data with the 2010 nursing home file, their variables were
each adjusted to reflect 2010 levels, based on the aggregate growth rate in assisted living
facilities, as reported by the AARP report on Assisted Living and Residential Care in the
States in 2010. Data from the ARF were likewise merged to the nursing home file based
on the county. Variables from the ARF include county-specific demographic
characteristics, such as per capita income, race, gender, poverty rate, mortality rate, and
region identifier.
The MetLife Market Survey was collected by the MetLife Mature Market
Institute. It contains daily private-pay price levels for nursing homes, monthly rates for
assisted living facilities, hourly rates for home health care agencies, and daily prices for
adult day services. The private rates are mainly at the state-level with some metropolitan
areas reported as well. Using state-level price information instead of recording it at
facility level could help avoid the endogeneity problem between price and quality, thus
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the state average private price levels were merged with the other previous mentioned data
sets to provide private-pay rates for each long-term care facility.
Data on state regulations covering long-term care facilities were also added to the
nursing home file. Most of the variables describing nursing home and assisted living
facility regulation take the form of (0,1) indicators. These variables were derived from
information reported in the State Data Book on Long Term Care (2007) Program and
Market Characteristics (funded by the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban
Development) and the Assisted Living State Regulatory Review (2007) (prepared by the
National Center for Assisted Living).
According to the State Date Book on Long Term Care, there are four types of
rate-setting systems for nursing homes, including prospectively set, flat rate, case-mix
based, and combination-type systems. The strictest is a flat rate system because it sets a
uniform level of reimbursement for the same class of homes, regardless of their variation
in costs. In contrast, a case-mix based system adjusts a nursing home’s rate based on its
residents’ case-mix which reflects differences in need. Under a prospective rate system a
nursing home’s reimbursement rate is set in advance, based on the previous costs level of
each facility, but it doesn’t account for the actual costs. A combination system has both
prospective and retrospective elements to how rates are set, so that interim rates
eventually align closer to actual costs. Since only one state has a flat rate system and one
state has a case-mix based system, this analysis could control for only the prospective and
combination systems in the regression models estimated.
State rate-setting systems for assisted living facilities can be categorized into five
approaches: flat rate, tiered rate, case-mix based rate, fee-for-service (FFS) rate, and
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negotiated rate systems. A flat rate system for assisted living facilities, just like a flat rate
system for nursing homes, does not allow any adjustments for conditional differences
across assisted living facilities. Rather, each facility receives the same flat rate. A casemix based system has the same basic logic as a case-mix reimbursement system for
nursing homes. A tiered rate system is quite similar to a case-mix based system, except it
typically has fewer rate categories than a case-mix based system. Under a fee-for-service
rate setting scheme, instead of receiving a monthly payment, the assisted living facility
has to send bill to the payment agency based on the services delivered to the resident.
Finally, a negotiated rate system is a method that combines some or all of the other four
systems. Table 2.1 describes all of the variables used in the analysis and their sources.

2.4 Empirical Specification of Variables
2.4.1 Quality Measures
Quality is a multidimensional concept. Measures of it fall into three categories:
structural measures, process-of-care measures, and outcome measures. Structural
measures are organizational characteristics of nursing homes, and include staffing levels
as well as the scope of the nursing home’s health-related deficiencies, such as the number
of federal minimum quality standards the facility fails to fulfill. Process measures include
the prevalence of indwelling catheters in the nursing home, the prevalence of tube
feeding, the prevalence of physical restraints, and the facility’s drug error rate. In general,
process measures depend on and reflect the interactions that are occurring between the
nursing home staff and its patients. Outcome measures, such as the prevalence of
pressure sores in the nursing home, are widely regarded as the most straight forward
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measures of care quality. Outcome measures represent changes in resident characteristics
that are directly attributable to the practice and environment of the nursing home.
In this paper measures from all three categories are used. Table 2.2 lists the nine
variables in the analysis that measure quality and their type. Although registered nurses
(RN) per bed, licensed practical nurses (LPN) per bed, and nurse aids per bed are all
measures of staffing levels, they should not be regarded as perfect substitutes. RNs
usually have more medical skills and can provide more intensive and skilled services to a
resident. LPNs focus more on daily medical routines that help preserve a resident’s well
being. The all-day-round care provided by nurse aids can possibly affect a resident’s
satisfaction and his/her mood. To acknowledge these differences in roles, all three are
used as quality indicators in the analysis. Measurements of catheter and pressure sores are
adjusted for pre-existing conditions where the prevalence is recorded as percentage of
residents who did not have but acquired catheter or pressure sore during the stay in
nursing home facilities.
2.4.2 Case Mix Measures
The analysis controls for the case mix of residents in order to ensure that the
quality indicators for each nursing home facility are not biased by case-mix differences.
A case-mix index was created to measure the level of sickness among residents in each
facility, and it was included in all nursing home quality regressions. The nursing home
case-mix index was built based on the "Management Minutes System" designed by Bill
Thoms (1975). It is expressed in minutes of staff time where different prevalence of
disability is given a different weight based on the level of sickness. The indicators of
disabilities are mutually exclusive and expressed in term of percentage of residents. In
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order to avoid multicollinearity in the statistical analysis, any quality indicator that is
embodied in the case-mix system was abandoned as dependant variables. The formula for
case-mix index calculation is shown in Appendix A.
2.4.3 Definition of the Market
Before local market competition can be measured, the relevant market needs to be
defined. The market should be a place where competition actually happens. In most
previous studies of nursing homes the county has been used to represent the local market.
Although not ideal, it has proven to be reasonable. For example, by looking at resident
characteristics in different regions, Nyman (1994), Gertler (1989), and Banaszak-Holl et
al (1996) all found that more than 75% of nursing home residents were from the same
county where the home they were in was located. Therefore, following Zinn(1994),
Cohen and Spector (1996), and Grabowski (2001), this study used the county to
approximate the relevant geographic market.
2.4.4 Excess Demand
States control the supply of nursing home beds through their certificate-of-need
and moratorium regulations. Limits on nursing home bed supply can lead to unfulfilled
demand in some markets, a phenomenon economists call "excess demand". When excess
demand exists, a facility may be able to strategically select residents based on its own
preferences. Because potential patients differ in terms of their payment rates and
sometimes health conditions, more profitable private-pay patients are usually admitted
first. When this happens individuals on Medicaid typically wait in line until an empty bed
becomes available. In effect, they lose the right to choose a nursing home based on its
quality, which in turn may reduce the willingness of local nursing homes to provide
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better quality and to compete with each other based on quality. Different studies have
reached different conclusions about the effects of excess demand on the quality of
nursing home care, and about how Medicaid reimbursement affects quality in the
presence of excess demand (Grabowski 2001, Gertler 1992, Nyman 1989). In this
analysis, excess demand was measured as the county-wide average percentage of empty
nursing home beds.

2.5 Econometric Framework
Using the 2010 data on nursing homes and their markets described above, we
examined the effects of market competition on nursing home quality by estimating a
series of linear regression models for the quality measures. In each model estimated, we
allowed for the possibility that nursing home beds and the structure of the market might
be endogenous to the facility. Specifically, Hausman tests were first conducted to check
the endogeneity of nursing home beds, per capita home care agencies, and per capita
assisted living beds. The results from these tests ruled out the endogeneity of nursing
home beds and home care agencies per capita, but they failed to reject the endogeneity of
assisted living beds per capita. To address this issue, two-stage least squares regression
model were adopted, explicitely treating assisted living beds per capita as endogenous.
The instrument variables should be correlated with assisted living facility bed
number but not correlated with nursing home quality indicators. State regulatory factors
that affect the assisted living industry, such as regulation of facility scope of care,
reimbursement methods, and whether the state had a Medicaid waiver covering assisted
living care, are good candidates for instrument variables. However, some other policy
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variables such as assisted living private-pay price level and assisted living certificate-ofneed regulation might be correlated with the nursing home quality indicators as well as
the variables measuring assisted living facilities. Thus, these variables were left out of the
first-stage regression and were used as independent variables in the second stage
regression only.
2.5.1 Statistical Models
The basic linear regression model is built as equation (1), where Qim is the
dependant variable for nursing home quality of nursing home i in market m. Series of
facility characteristics for nursing home i in market m is are included in Xim. Sm, which is
the key set of variables in this paper, is composed of market competition from nursing
homes, assisted living facilities, and home care agencies in market m. Zm represents
county level demographic characteristics. RmNH are variables for nursing home state
regulations.
Qim=β1Xim+β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4SmAL+β5Zm+β6RmNH+εim

(1)

Because of the endogeneity of the assisted living beds per capita, the actual
regression model is regressed in two stages with instrument variables dealing with the
endogenous variable. Thus, for the first stage, we have:
SmAL = β1Xim+ β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4Zm+ β5RmNH+β6RmAL+εm

(2)

where SmAL is endogenous, and RmAL is a vector of state regulation instruments to identify
the model. Upon estimating equation (2), the following second stage equation was
estimated for each quality measure:
Qim=β1Xim+β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4ŜmAL+β5Zm+β6RmNH+εim
where ŜmAL was the estimated value from equation (2).

(3)
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In order to further examine the possible effects of market competition on variables
other than quality, two more linear regressions were also estimated. Equation (4) below
describes the price per day received by the nursing home, and equation (5) below
describes the case-mix of its residents:
PmNH=β1Xim+β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4SmAL+β5Zm+β6RmNH+εim

(4)

CMimNH=β1Xim+β2SmNH+ β3SmHC+ β4SmAL+β5Zm+β6RmNH+εim

(5)

where PmNH measures the nursing home’s daily private-pay price level for market m, and
CMimNH is the case-mix index for nursing home i in market m. In estimating equations (4)
and (5) we allowed for possible heteroscedasticity in the standard errors.

2.6 Results
Table 2.3 reports the mean and standard deviations for all variables used in the
analysis.
2.6.1 Effects of Competition on Nursing Home Quality
Table 2.4 summarizes the key results from the two-stage least squares regressions
for the nine quality indicators. It reports on the coefficients in these models for variables
that measure local market competition from nursing homes, home care agencies, and
assisted living facilities. Although not reported in the table, each of the models estimated
also controlled for all the variables shown in the data summary, and the full regressions
are available from the author upon request. Each column of the table describes a different
quality measure.
The first three quality indicators measure staffing per bed, and were computed as
the number of nursing home professionals per 1000 nursing home beds. The measures
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were rescaled for the purpose of reporting coefficients. Staffing levels are believed to be
positively correlated with nursing home quality, i.e., the higher the staffing level per bed,
the better the nursing home’s quality. The remaining six quality indicators measure
deficiencies in health care services, care procedures, and health outcomes, and they are
believed to be negatively related to the quality level of a nursing home. For example, the
higher the percentage of residents who have facility-acquired pressure sores, the lower
the nursing home’s quality. Thus, a positive relationship of an independent variable with
a positive quality indicator suggests an increase in that variable increases quality,
whereas a positive relationship with a negative quality indicator suggests an increase in
that independent variable decreases quality.
Each quality model included four measures of local market competition.
Competition from assisted living facilities was measured by the number of assisted living
facility beds per capita in the county. Competition from home care agencies was
measured by the number of home care agencies per capita in the county. Competition
from other nursing homes in the area was measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI) of
nursing home bed share in each county. The index used in the regression is adjusted by 1
minus the actual index in order to better ally with the magnitude of competition. After the
alternation, a higher adjusted HHI value indicates more intense competition among
nursing homes. Finally, the county-wide average percent of empty nursing home beds is a
proxy for the presence of excess bed demand in the market.
The results in Table 2.4 strongly suggest that nursing home quality was affected
by local competition from home health agencies, assisted living facilities, as well as other
nursing homes. The coefficients of home care agencies per capita are statistically
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significant for eight of the quality indicators. Competition from home health agencies,
however, had mixed effects on quality, tending to reduce nursing staffing levels, while it
had mostly positive effects on other structure, process and outcome quality measurements.
Judging from the regression results, competition from home care agencies was mainly
focused in the labor market where both home care agencies and nursing homes are trying
to get more professional nursing staff. The marginal effect of one unit increase in the
home care agency per capita would lead to a decrease of 2.45 RN per bed in nursing
homes and a 10.33 decrease of nurse aides per nursing home bed. However, the
competition from home care agencies doesn’t bring down nursing home quality measured
by number of health deficiencies, percentage physically restrained resident, percentage
with facility acquired catheters and drug error rate.
In contrast, Table 2.4 also reveals that competition from assisted living facility
mainly improves staffing levels in nursing homes, but reduces quality indicated by
process measurements. This is likely the result of differences in residents’ characteristics
between these two types of long-term care providers. Residents in assisted living
facilities tend to be "low-care" patients (Mor et al.2007) who generally have less severe
medical needs than residents in nursing homes. Morand colleagues found that about 5 to
12 percent of nursing home residents fall into the category, "low-care". The proportion of
these residents is higher in states with lower investment in assisted living facilities. This
suggests that where there is a greater presence of assisted living facilities there will be
fewer "low-care" patients in nursing homes, leaving nursing homes with residents who
have higher levels of disabilities. In this case, nursing homes will need higher levels of
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nursing staff, and the health conditions will be lower for the nursing home residents as
well.
The latter part of this explanation is supported by the regression results for the
process and outcome quality indicators. The number of health deficiencies, the
percentage of residents physically restrained, the percentage with catheters, and the drug
error rate are all higher in markets with a high number of assisted living beds per capita.
These results suggest that when assisted living beds per capita increases by 1, this
increases the number of health deficiencies in the nursing home by 89.39, the drug error
rate by 3.72, the percentage of residents who are physically restrained by 7.46, and the
percentage with catheters by 2.25. However, the health outcome measured by percentage
of residents with facility acquired pressure sore improves in the presence of greater
competition from assisted living facilities, e.g., a 1 unit increase in assisted living beds
per capita decreases the percentage of residents with pressure sores by 4.22.
This finding of negative competition effects on health deficiencies is consistent
with recent findings from Bowblis (2012), who studied markets for long-term care in
Ohio. He found that a one-unit increase in assisted living beds per 100 population could
increase regulatory deficiencies by 4.60. Coefficients on factors, such as percentage
physically restrained and percentage with facility acquired catheters that are not
significant in his analysis using Ohio state data are significant using the national sample
in this study.
The coefficients on the HHI measure the effects of competition from other nearby
nursing homes. Competition from other nursing homes appears to have positive effect on
staffing levels, while the effects on resident health outcome are mixed. The results

22

suggest that greater competition from nearby nursing homes decreases the percentage of
resident with facility-acquired catheters, but at the same time, it increases the percentage
of patients taking antipsychotic medication or who have pressure sores.
Bowblis (2012) used nursing home facility per capita as a proxy for nursing
homes’ within sector competition. Despite the difference in competition proxy, the
findings about the effects on nursing home resident outcomes are consistent. The drug
error rate will also increase with nursing home competition, which the study done by
Bowblis failed to measure.
Zinn (1994) also includes a HHI to indicate market concentration in his analysis
of nursing home quality. He finds a higher concentration of nursing homes will decrease
prevalence of physically restrained, catheterized, and not toileted residents in nursing
homes. Although percentage not toileted is not included in this study and percentage
physically restrained is not significant in the result, the conclusion with catheterized
residents in this study is completely opposite from the one by Zinn. This discrepancy
might be caused by difference in measuring prevalence of catheter as facility acquired or
as overall level. It also might be affected by the market changes through time. Zinn’s
study was based on data from 1987 when home and community based services have not
thrived, while this study used 2010 data that fully encompasses the effects from assisted
living and home care sectors. The study done by Grabowski in 2004 using data from
1991 to 1998 also has some consistent as well as opposite conclusion with our results.
These differences in the conclusions further support the argument that more recent and
more comprehensive analyses are needed following the huge change in the long-term
care market.
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The county average percentage of empty beds serves as a statistically significant
and negative explanatory variable for all nine nursing home quality measurements.
Although it might seem intuitive to think that with higher level of empty beds, nursing
homes using the same amount of staffing and resource can concentrate on smaller
number of resident, thus the quality should increase. However, this hypothesis is not
supported by the empirical results. Actually, based on the excess demand theory, when
the bed constraint is in effect, nursing homes have the power to choose residents. In this
case, the homes will most likely choose private payers over Medicaid residents because
of the higher price. When there is lower demand than supply, nursing homes lose the
power to discriminate on the payer type. Therefore, there will be higher proportion of
Medicaid residents in the facilities. Furthermore, as is proven by pervious literature and
the regression on case-mix in Table 2.6, the disability level for Medicaid residents are
significantly higher. Research done by Nyman (1988) also shows that the low-qualityhigh-Medicaid relationship not only exists, but is much stronger with excess demand.
Under the influences of both worse health conditions and lower payment rate, higher
percentage of Medicaid payers will more likely bring down the overall nursing home
quality measurements.
2.6.2 Effects of Competition on Nursing Home Private-Pay Price
Table 2.5 shows how the nursing home private daily average price is influenced
by market competition. As shown in Table 2.5, competition from home care agencies
decreases the nursing home private daily price significantly. This result indicates that the
competition effect from home care agencies to nursing homes is mainly presented in the
form of price. A study done by Li and Jensen (2011), which analyzes the long-term care
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usage pattern of long-term care insurance (LTCI) policy holders, shows that LTCI
holders who have moderate disabilities would prefer to stay at home than entering a
nursing facility to receive care. This result illustrates that competition from home care
agencies reduces the demand of nursing home residents who have LTCI. With the price
difference of a private insurer and a Medicaid patient, this competition reduces the price
level for nursing homes.
On the other hand, competition from assisted living facilities and other nursing
homes both affect nursing home private price positively. However, the magnitudes of
these effects on price are very small. For example, a 1 unit increase in the per capita
assisted living bed increases the nursing home price by 5.9, and a 1 point change in the
nursing home HHI increases the price by 0.93. A positive price effect of competition
from assisted living facility might stem from a higher disability rate in nursing homes
when there is higher penetration of assisted living facilities. It might also be a result of
reverse causality where assisted living facilities grow faster in areas where the price level
of nursing home services is higher. The positive competition effect on price from other
nursing homes seems counter-intuitive. However, with some limitations in the data sets,
nursing homes which are from the same multi-site firm cannot be distinguished from
others. Although these nursing homes might be considered as independent small firms
that help intensify competition, they are actually operating under the same regime which
could reduce competition and increase price.
The association between the average percentage of empty beds in the county and
the private-pay price is consistent with economic theory. When demand is lower, price
will be lower too. Although only the private-pay price of nursing home service is shown
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in Table 2.5, the competition effects on Medicaid reimbursement rate are similar as the
private price because of a high correlation (0.6011) between the two price levels.
2.6.3 Effects of Competition on Nursing Home Case Mix
Table 2.6 reports how nursing home case-mix index is affected by market
competition. The more home care agencies per capita in a county, the lower the case-mix
index of nursing home residents in that county. In other words, competition from home
care agencies help reduce the case-mix of nursing home residents, leaving nursing homes
with a healthier group that further lower the burden of providing more services. This may
be caused by the proportion of post hospital care patients who use home care agency
mostly for recovery. These patients whose case-mix indexes are much higher are
generally in need of more nursing care. However, strictly speaking, they should not be
counted as long-term care patients because they typically need just a relatively short
period time of health services. Drawing this part of resident out of nursing homes might
be the reason why number of home care agencies is negatively associated with residents’
case-mix in nursing homes.
Assisted living facilities, on the other hand, provide services to individuals who
are in less need of care. Competition from assisted living facilities will attract residents
with better health conditions moving out of nursing homes, thus increases nursing home
case-mix index. Furthermore, as the study done by Spillman et al (2002), the annual use
of assisted living residents are much longer than before that about 45 percent of resident
stayed throughout the year in 1998. This usage pattern implies that the "low-care" users
stay longer in the assisted living facilities than before. This longer stay will delay the
timing of entering nursing homes. In that case, when they are actually moved out of
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assisted livings into nursing homes, their health conditions would be much worse than
before. With the effects from both resident characteristics and usage patterns, competition
from assisted living facility increases case-mix index of residents in nursing homes. This
assumption is supported by the empirical results here.
Competition from other nursing home shown by the HHI index is positively
associated with nursing home case-mix. In other words, case-mix in nursing homes
increases with higher level of competition among nursing homes. For a nursing home that
operates as a monopoly in a market, it has the full power to choose residents and to set
price discrimination. Under this circumstance, healthier and better-paying patients tend to
be admitted, and the ones with worse health conditions are left out. When competition
becomes more and more severe, however, nursing homes compete for residents by
broadening their scopes in admitting patients. In this way, patients with more
complications and who need more resources are more likely to be admitted, thus the casemix in nursing homes is higher with more market competition.

2.7 Conclusion
With the rapid growth in home care agencies and assisted living facilities across
the U.S., nursing homes face new sources of competition for provision of long-term care
services. This paper is the first to study how local competition from home care agencies
and assisted living facilities affects care quality in nursing homes, the private-pay prices
they charge, and the case-mix complexity of their residents. From this nationwide
analysis of nursing home care quality in 2010, five broad findings emerge.
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First, nursing home quality is affected by local competition from assisted living
facilities, home care agencies, and other nursing homes. Overall, these effects are mostly
statistically significant and intuitive. At the same time, different types of competitors
have different effects on nursing homes.
Second, increased competition from home care agencies has mixed effects on
nursing home quality. Its effects on staff-to-bed ratios were mostly negative, whereas its
effects on other structure, process, and outcome quality measures were mostly positive.
We also found evidence that increased competition from home care agencies affects the
private-pay prices that nursing homes charge. As the supply of local home care providers
increases, the private-pay price in nursing homes declines. One interpretation is that
nursing homes are competing with home care providers on the basis of price.
Third, increased competition from assisted living facilities also has mixed effects.
Despite some positive effects on staff-to-bed ratios, competition from assisted living
facility overall tends to lower nursing home quality. This is because having more assisted
living beds in an area significantly raises the case-mix complexity in the nursing home.
Since "low-care" residents prefer assisted living facilities, the nursing home’s case-mix
shifts to a more-disabled, sicker mix of residents. We also presented evidence that the
private-pay price in the nursing home also rose in order to cover the higher cost of caring
for this more disabled patient mix. But given a more severe case-mix, care quality tends
to suffer.
Fourth, increased competition from other nursing homes had positive effects on
staff-to-bed ratios, while the effects on resident health outcomes were mixed.
Competition from other nursing homes decreased the percentage of residents with a
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facility-acquired catheter, but increased the percentage of patients taking antipsychotics,
the percentage with pressure sores, and the drug error rate in the facility.
Fifth, excess demand for nursing home beds in an area has significant negative
effects on all measures of nursing home quality. A high empty bed rate may be caused by
lower overall demand, and it might also be the result of competition from home and
community based services. Under both causes, nursing homes have less power to choose
their residents. More Medicaid patients and more "high-care" patients may be admitted,
causing the decrease in nursing home quality.
Overall, the findings in this paper are broadly consistent with previous research
on the effects of competition in the market for nursing home care. We found that
competition from assisted living facilities has mixed effects on care quality in nursing
homes. Although staff-to-bed ratios rise, other measures of care quality tend to fall, in
part because of the worsening case-mix of the nursing home’s residents. The effects of
competition from home care agencies reported here are presented for the first time, and
so cannot be compared to prior studies. Yet, our findings for this source of competition
seem reasonable. The effects of competition from other nursing homes reported here are
differ in some ways from what previous researchers have found. This may be due to
differences in the time frame across different studies. With the exception of Bowblis
(2012), most previous work on this issue was based on much older data, when nursing
homes were the dominant suppliers in markets for long-term care.
In summary, long-term care provided by nursing homes appears to be evolving in
response to growing market competition from assisted living facilities and home care
agencies. Faced with greater competition from assisted living facilities, nursing homes
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are left to care for the more disabled and less healthy patients. Although a facility’s
staffing levels rise in response, other measures of care quality decline, such as more
process- and outcome-based measures. There are strong indications that the
transformation of nursing homes and the market for long-term care will continue.

30
Tables for Chapter 2:
Table 2.1 Variable Descriptions
Variable

Definition

Source

RN/Beds

Total number of registered nurses per beds in each nursing
facility

CASPER

LPN/Beds

Total number of licensed practical nurses per beds in each
nursing facility

CASPER

Nurse Aides/Beds

Total number of Nurse Aides per beds in each nursing
facility

CASPER

Health Deficiencies

Number of regulatory health deficiencies in each nursing
facility

NHC

Drug Error Rate

Percentage of drug error in each facility

CASPER

Percentage Physically
Restrained

Percentage of resident in each facility who are physically
restrained

CASPER

Percentage
Antipsychotic

Percentage of resident in each facility who use antipsychotic
medication

CASPER

Percentage Acquired
Catheters

Percentage of resident in each facility who acquired catheter
during the stay

CASPER

Percentage Acquired
Pressure Sores

Percentage of resident in each facility who are acquired
pressure sore during the stay

CASPER

Quality Measures

Nursing Home Facility Characteristics
NH Beds Per Capita

Nursing home total beds per capita for each facility

CASPER

NH Ownership

Dummy variable if Government owned=1; 0=otherwise

CASPER

For/Non- Profit

Dummy variable For-profit=1; Non-profit=0

CASPER

Provider Based Facility

Dummy variable =1 if provider based; 0=otherwise

CASPER

Percentage Medicaid
Residents

Percentage of Medicaid residents in each facility

CASPER

Special Care Beds

Percentage of nursing home beds for Alzheimer patients

CASPER

Case-Mix Index

Case mix measurement for each facility

CASPER

Market Structure
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NH Avg Empty Beds

Average percentage of nursing home empty beds in county

CASPER

HC Agency Per Capita

Number of home care agencies per capita in county

POS

AL Beds Per Capita

Number of assisted living beds per capita in county

Stevensen 2010

NH Herfindahl Index

Nursing home Herfindahl Index in each county

CASPER

County Demographic Characteristics
Census Region Code

1=Northeast 2=Midwest 3=South 4=West

ARF

County Per Capita
Income

Per capita income in each county

ARF

Population 65+

Percentage of population age 65 and over in county

ARF

Adult Female

Percentage of population adult female in county

ARF

Medicaid Eligible

Percentage of Medicaid eligible older adults in 65 and over
age group in each county

ARF

Mortality Rate

County mortality rate

ARF

Poverty Rate

County poverty rate

ARF

Percentage White

Percentage white population in county

ARF

Percentage Black

Percentage black population in county

ARF

Population Density

Population density per square mile in county

ARF

Low Education Type

Dummy variable for low educational region

ARF

NH daily Avg Price

Nursing home private-pay daily average price

MetLife Market
Survey

NH Price Ratio

Nursing home Medicaid reimbursement rate over nursing
home private pay price

MetLife Market
Survey

AL Daily Avg Price

Assisted living facility private-pay daily average price

MetLife Market
Survey

HC hourly Avg Price

Home health care agency private-pay hourly average price

MetLife Market
Survey

Adult Day Care Daily
Avg Price

Adult day care facility private-pay daily average price

MetLife Market
Survey

NH CON

Dummy variable for state nursing home Certificates of Need
regulation

State Data Book

State Policy Factors
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NH Prospective
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for prospective reimbursement system

State Data Book

NH Combination
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for combination reimbursement system

State Data Book

NH Case-Mix Adjusters

Dummy variable of whether the reimbursement rate is
adjusted for case-mix

State Data Book

AL CON

Dummy variable for state assisted living Certificates of
Need regulation

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Facility Scope of
Care

Dummy variable of whether the assisted living facility could
provide nursing services

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Medicaid Waiver

Dummy variable of whether the state Medicaid waiver could
cover assisted living costs

AL Regulatory
Review

AL State Plan

Dummy variable of whether there is a state plan to cover
assisted living costs

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Flat Rate
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for flat rate reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Tiered Rate
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for tiered rate reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Case-Mix
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for case-mix reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review

AL FFS Reimbursement

Dummy variable for fee-for-service reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Negotiated
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for negotiated reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review
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Table 2.2 Type of Quality Indicators
Quality Indicator

Type of Indicator

RN/Bed

Structure

LPN/Bed

Structure

Nurse Aids/Bed

Structure

Health Deficiency

Structure

Drug Error Rate

Process

Percentage Physically Restrained

Process

Percentage Antipsychotic

Process

Percentage Acquire Catheters

Process

Percentage Acquire Pressure Sores

Outcome
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Table 2.3 Descriptive Statistics of All Variables
Total observation number: 13426
Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

RN/Beds

0.07169

0.08586

LPN/Beds

0.135396

0.126905

Nurse Aides/Beds

0.378815

0.185241

Health Deficiencies

14.98494

11.32956

Drug Error Rate

1.504207

4.067297

Percentage Physically Restrained

3.11389

5.58665

Percentage Antipsychotic

25.19481

14.81464

Percentage Acquire Catheters

1.623429

2.80799

Percentage Acquire Pressure Sores

2.941331

3.245092

NH Beds Per Capita

0.165465

0.148378

NH Ownership

0.761367

0.426264

For/Non- Profit

0.705123

0.456005

Provider Based Facility

0.048494

0.214816

Percentage Medicaid Residents

62.89192

19.74553

Special Care Beds

4.987203

13.21166

Case-Mix Index

141.9866

43.93583

NH Avg Empty Beds

17.34904

10.53505

HC Agency Per Capita

0.036434

0.057068

AL Beds Per Capita

0.311181

0.221559

Herfindahl Index (1-HHI)

0.7740254

0.2565023

Census Region Code

2.461169

0.946563

County Per Capita Income (in 1000s)

1.722276

0.721113

Population 65+

14.08715

3.631144

Adult Female

30.0873

2.268431
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Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Medicaid eligible

15.28146

7.763679

Mortality Rate

0.904158

0.23473

Poverty Rate

15.58205

5.318782

Percentage White

77.39127

16.67342

Percentage Black

11.00004

12.85455

Population Density (in1000s)

1.244913

4.045115

Low Education Type

0.121789

0.327054

NH daily Avg Price

192.0493

58.36996

NH Price Ratio

132.4298

68.02018

AL Daily Avg Price

107.2017

19.53959

HC hourly Avg Price

20.66501

2.799751

Adult Day Care Daily Avg Price

60.38816

17.47155

NH CON

0.773915

0.41831

NH Prospective Reimbursement

0.849497

0.357577

NH Combination Reimbursement

0.136091

0.342898

NH Case-Mix Adjusters

0.677738

0.46736

AL CON

0.156333

0.363184

AL Facility Scope of Care

0.749871

0.434623

AL Medicaid Waiver

0.716859

0.450541

AL State Plan

0.244645

0.487086

AL Flat Rate Reimbursement

0.312043

0.463347

AL Tiered Rate Reimbursement

0.432814

0.495487

AL Case-Mix Reimbursement

0.14892

0.356025

AL FFS Reimbursement

0.070242

0.255565

AL Negotiated Reimbursement

0.035982

0.186253
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Table 2.4 Two-stage Least Square Model on Nine Quality Indicators:
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Table 2.5 Linear Regression on Nursing Home Daily Average Price
Nursing Home Daily Average Price
HC Agency Per Capita
AL Beds Per Capita
NH Herfindahl Index
NH Avg Empty Beds
NH Beds Per Capita
NH Ownership
For/Non- Profit
Provider Based Facility
Medicaid Residents
Special Care Beds
Case-Mix Index
Census Region Code
County Per Capita Income (in1000s)
Population 65+
Adult Female
Medicaid eligible
Mortality Rate
Poverty Rate
Percentage White
Percentage Black
Population Density (in1000s)
Low Education Type
AL Daily Avg Price
HC Hourly Avg Price
Adult Day Care Daily Avg Price
NH CON
AL CON
NH Prospective Reimbursement
NH Combination Reimbursement
NH Case-Mix Adjusters
_cons

Coef.
-282.378***
5.943***
0.925***
-0.986***
296.548***
5.610***
-2.613*
3.914*
0.163***
-0.007
0.064***
-13.840***
-2.847***
2.553***
2.056***
-0.204***
-33.054***
0.428***
-0.510***
-0.746***
0.803***
4.510***
1.576***
-0.817***
0.185***
23.485***
-14.997***
-47.474***
-50.976***
-7.254***
64.876***

Std. Err.
(104.318)
(2.538)
(0.202)
(0.038)
(46.124)
(1.711)
(1.583)
(2.217)
(0.017)
(0.021)
(0.019)
(0.570)
(0.645)
(0.190)
(0.181)
(0.056)
(3.007)
(0.094)
(0.078)
(0.076)
(0.081)
(1.071)
(0.027)
(0.141)
(0.023)
(1.126)
(0.852)
(1.438)
(1.497)
(0.735)
(10.876)

Estimated coefficients are reported for each variable and standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at the 90% confidence level ** significant at the 95% confidence level *** significant at
the 99% confidence level
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Table 2.6 Linear Regression on Nursing Home Case-mix Index
NH Case-Mix Index
HC Agency Per Capita
AL Beds Per Capita
NH Herfindahl Index
NH Avg Empty Beds
NH Beds Per Capita
NH Ownership
For/Non- Profit
Provider Based Facility
Medicaid Residents
Special Care Beds
Census Region Code
County Per Capita Income (in1000s)
Population 65+
Adult Female
Medicaid eligible
Mortality Rate
Poverty Rate
Percentage White
Percentage Black
Population Density (in1000s)
Low Education Type
Nursing Home Daily Average Price
AL Daily Avg Price
HC Hourly Avg Price
Adult Day Care Daily Avg Price
NH CON
AL CON
NH Prospective Reimbursement
NH Combination Reimbursement
NH Case-Mix Adjusters
_cons

Coef.
-67.600*
2.493*
0.525***
-0.285***
-28.751
2.775
-6.475***
-2.477
0.091*
-0.001
4.728***
-2.989***
-0.144
0.261
0.254***
-7.410**
-0.295*
0.308***
0.418***
-0.735***
0.100
0.113***
-0.007
-1.122***
-0.086***
-4.726***
5.308***
4.834***
5.948***
3.541***
110.307***

Std. Err.
(38.170)
(1.510)
(0.135)
(0.036)
(41.364)
(2.106)
(2.204)
(2.157)
(0.052)
(0.020)
(0.609)
(0.851)
(0.238)
(0.240)
(0.076)
(3.225)
(0.169)
(0.047)
(0.053)
(0.108)
(1.384)
(0.013)
(0.025)
(0.112)
(0.020)
(0.869)
(2.144)
(1.561)
(2.248)
(1.067)
(10.620)

Estimated coefficients are reported for each variable and standard errors are in parentheses.
* significant at the 90% confidence level ** significant at the 95% confidence level *** significant at
the 99% confidence level
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Chapter 3
State Regulation of Long-Term Care Providers
and the Quality of Care in Nursing Homes

3.1 Introduction
The rising number of elderly, disabled, and chronically ill individuals in the US
has brought increased attention to the utilization, cost, and quality of long-term care
services. Long-term care encompasses a broad range of services, including both medical
and non-medical care provided to individuals who need assistance performing activities
of daily living. It has been estimated as many as 70 percent of older adults over age 65
will require long-term care services at some point during their remaining lives (CMS
2012). As the major payer for long-term care, state Medicaid programs face the daunting
challenge of trying to balance the growing needs of an aging population with the
unwillingness of many state legislators to expand their Medicaid budgets to pay for
needed services. This situation has led to growing concerns about the quality of care
provided to Medicaid residents in nursing homes, as well as a desire among many state
legislators to cut back on Medicaid reimbursement rates, program eligibility, and the use
of publically-financed long-term care, more generally. Consumers, the media, and the
Institute of Medicine are particularly concerned with care quality in nursing homes.
Nursing homes are the major providers of long-term care in the US. They have
also been the main focus of government regulation pertaining to long-term care services.
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Policies such as certificate-of-need (CON) legislation, which are used by a majority of
states, set barriers to the addition of new beds in this industry, in order to control the
overall supply of nursing home services. Medicaid reimbursement policies, which have
the most direct and significant effect on nursing home revenue, set the amount and
method of payment for Medicaid-covered stays in nursing home facilities. These policies
not only control the amount of services available, they can also affect the quality of care
provided by a nursing home. Under law every nursing home is required to provide the
same quality of care to all its residents, regardless of their payer source. Thus, if a
nursing home reduces its cost of producing care in response to lower Medicaid payment
rates, erosion in the quality of care for all patients may occur.
Under the assumption of a binding bed constraint created by CON regulation,
economic theory suggests that the market for nursing home care will be characterized by
excess demand among Medicaid-eligible individuals (Scanlon 1980). In effect, a binding
bed constraint gives nursing homes the power to choose patients based on the generosity
of their payment source, leaving lower-paying (and often sicker) Medicaid patients with
less access to care. Furthermore, in the presence of excess demand, the effects of
Medicaid reimbursement rates on care quality are actually ambiguous (Nyman 1985,
Gertler 1989). On one hand, an increase in the rate gives a nursing home more resources
that it could use to produce more quality, as suggested by a basic theory of economic
production. If it produces more quality, it could likely attract more private pay patients,
since quality matters to them. However, the economic reward of having another privatepay patient (as opposed to a Medicaid patient) is simply the difference in the prices they
come with, which will now be lower if the Medicaid rate increases. In effect, as long as
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excess demand is present, a nursing home’s return to raising quality can decline with an
increase in the Medicaid rate. Thus, it may actually choose to lower quality rather than
increase it.

This possibility has motivated a number of researchers to empirically

investigate the relationship between nursing home quality and Medicaid reimbursement
rates, with particular attention to whether the findings depend on the presence of excess
demand in the market (Nyman (1985, 1988, 1989), Gertler 1992, Cohen and Spector
1996, Grabowski (1999, 2001, 2007)). Findings from these studies have been mixed.
In recent decades, alternatives have emerged to receiving long-term care in a
nursing home setting. In most areas of the US two other types of providers of long-term
care services are now available, assisted living facilities and home health care agencies.
Assisted living facilities are community-based, residential long-term care centers, which
provide housing and supportive services to older adults. Since 1990 the total number of
beds in assisted living facilities has grown rapidly. For example, in 2010 there were a
total of 1,233,690 beds in licensed assisted living facilities across the US, up from
519,905 in 1990 (AARP 2010). For all but the most disabled and severely ill patients, an
assisted living facility may be a feasible substitute for a nursing home. Such facilities can
provide both professional medical care and services to assist with activities of daily living.
Furthermore, assisted living facilities are preferred to nursing homes for older adults who
seek for more independence and dignity (Perkins et al 2012). There are now 1.8 million
individuals who live in the nation's 16,000 nursing homes (Kaye 2010) and more than
735,000 individuals who live in assisted living facilities (NCAL 2012).
Home health care agencies, which deliver services in a patient’s home, are
another important substitute for some types of nursing home care. More and more
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seniors have shifted from receiving services in nursing homes to receiving services at
home from home care agencies. This trend is perhaps not surprising, as most older adults
strongly prefer staying at home and living independently to being institutionalized
(Gibson et al. 2003).
With these significant changes in the structure of the market for long-term care,
the demand for nursing home care, and the quality of nursing home services may also
have changed. In addition, new state regulations have emerged governing Medicaid
policy and standards of care in assisted living facilities, and these too may be influencing
equilibrium quality levels in nursing homes.
Despite the potentially important role of home care agencies and assisted living
facilities in the long-term care market, no studies to date have considered the effects of
local competition from these two sectors when looking at the relationship between
Medicaid regulation and nursing home quality.

Nor has any study considered the

possible spillover effects of state regulation of businesses in these two other sectors. Yet,
analyzing the determinants of nursing home quality in isolation from the rest of the longterm care market could lead to biased estimates and false conclusions if, in fact,
competition and state regulations matter in decision-making.
This study examines the effects of Medicaid regulation on nursing home quality,
controlling for local market competition from home care agencies and assisted living
facilities, as well as state regulation of assisted living facilities. State regulation of
assisted living facilities can affect nursing home quality by affecting the supply of
assisted living facilities, which in turn competes with nursing homes.
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 1 provides background information on
the long-term market and briefly reviews existing literature on the determinants of
nursing home quality. Section 2 describes data sources and variable specifications used in
the empirical analysis, while Section 3 describes statistical methods. Results are
presented in Section 4. Section 5 summarizes conclusion from this study, their policy
implications, and describes possible future work.

3.2 Background
Several previous studies have examined the effects of Medicaid reimbursement
rates on nursing home quality. The earliest studies were based on data from single states.
Using data on nursing homes in Wisconsin, Nyman (1988, 1989) examined the effects of
a facility’s Medicaid reimbursement rate on its total number of violations of quality
standards for nursing homes. Analyzing data from two different years, 1979 and 1983,
he found no evidence to suggest quality was higher with higher reimbursement. In fact,
he found the opposite: quality was lower in homes receiving a higher Medicaid
reimbursement rate. His explanation for these finding was that most nursing homes in
Wisconsin had excess Medicaid demand in these years due to stringent certificate-ofneed (CON) regulation. In the presence of excess Medicaid demand, a higher Medicaid
rate is associated with a lower return to raising quality to attract more private pay patients
along with no return to raising quality to attract more Medicaid patients.
Using data on nursing homes in New York State and a different measure of
quality, Gertler (1992) likewise found an inverse relationship between the Medicaid
reimbursement rate and quality of care. He found that a 10% increase in Medicaid
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expenditures decreased a nursing home’s expenditures on patient services by 3.4%, but
yet was positively related to the number of Medicaid residents receiving care. A 10%
increase in Medicaid expenditures increased the latter by 4.1%. He too attributed these
findings to the presence of excess Medicaid demand in most New York markets because
of the state’s stringent CON regulation.
More recent studies, however, based mostly on nationwide samples of nursing
homes (as opposed to single state samples), have found a positive relationship between
Medicaid reimbursement levels and care quality. For example, Spector (1996) found a
positive relationship between the Medicaid reimbursement rate and LPN staffing
intensity, an input-based measure of quality. Grabowski (2001a) found that the Medicaid
reimbursement rate had a positive effect on the percentage of residents without facilityacquired pressure ulcers, which is an important outcomes-based quality indicator. His
analysis was based on a nationwide sample of nursing homes observed in 1995 and 1996.
With the same data Grabowski (2001b) looked at several other measures of care quality,
as well.

He found a significant positive relationship between the Medicaid

reimbursement rate and nurse staffing levels per resident. For example, he found that a
$40 increase in the reimbursement rate raised the number of registered nurses by 1.42 per
100 residents. Yet the same increase had insignificant (but still positive) effects on more
process-based quality indicators, such as the medication error rate in a facility, the
prevalence of feeding tubes, the prevalence of catheters, and the prevalence of physical
restraints. More recently Grabowski (2004) analyzed longitudinal data on nursing homes
spanning 1991 through 1998, and found that nearly all quality indicators improved as the
Medicaid reimbursement rate increased.

For example, a 10 percent increase in the
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Medicaid rate was associated with a 1.8 decrease in the percentage of nursing home
resident with bedsores.
In all of the above-mentioned studies the effect of excess Medicaid demand on the
relationship between nursing home quality and the Medicaid reimbursement rate was
emphasized. Several of these studies also suggest that in markets where there are severe
CON construction moratorium policies on nursing home beds together with excess
Medicaid demand, the counterintuitive result of an inverse relationship between Medicaid
reimbursement and quality has resulted.
The problem of constraints on available beds in long term care facilities appears
to have lessened since the 1980s, according to a couple of different measures. One is the
occupancy rate in nursing homes, which has declined slowly but steadily over time. For
example, it was 91.8% in 1985, 87.4% in 1995, and 86% in 2004 (Strahan 1997 and CDC
2014). Another indicator is the increasing supply of substitutes for nursing home care,
such as other home care and community based facilities. Between 1990 and 2002, for
example, the number of beds in assisted living facilities nearly doubled, rising from
519,905 to 1,026,397 nationwide (Harrington et al. 2005). Home care agencies have also
become more common.
It is important to take account of these alternatives to nursing homes, i.e., home
care agencies and the assisted living facilities, when analyzing the relationship between
Medicaid policies and nursing home quality. Yet, surprisingly few previous studies have
done so. Bowblis (2012) is an exception. He examined how the growth of assisted living
facilities and market structure has affected nursing home quality in Ohio-based nursing
homes. Yet, because his sample was limited to a single state, his study was unable to
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simultaneously address the policy effects of Medicaid. It is worthwhile to take a close
look at how market structure and the existence of home and community based services
can affect the influential power of government regulation on nursing home quality.
Using data from a nationwide census of nursing homes observed in 2010, this
study examines the effects of state regulatory policies towards both the nursing home
sector and the assisted living facilities sector on the quality of care in U.S. nursing homes.
It addresses two questions. First, how is nursing home quality affected by a state’s
Medicaid reimbursement rate and the methods a state uses to control competition from
other long-term care sectors? Second, is nursing home quality affected by how a state
regulates assisted living facilities, and if so, how?

3.3 Data
Data from several sources were assembled to conduct the analysis. The primary
source of data on nursing homes was the on-line 2010 Certification and Survey Provider
Enhanced Reporting System (CASPER), maintained by the Center for Medicare and
Medicaid Services (CMS). In addition, other data were drawn from the 2010 Nursing
Home Compare (NHC) data set maintained by CMS, the Provider of Services File (POS)
maintained by CMS, the Area Resource File (ARF), the MetLife Market Survey of
Nursing Homes data, the Assisted Living, Adult Day Services, and Home Care Costs
(MetLife Market Survey) data, the State Data Book on Long Term Care (State Data
Book), the Assisted Living State Regulatory Review (AL Regulatory Review), and
assisted living facility supply data collected by Stevenson and Grawboski (2010).
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The facility-level nursing home data are from the CASPER and NHC data sets.
The CASPER data set replaces the Online Survey, Certification, and Reporting (OSCAR)
System, which was also maintained by CMS.

CASPER provides comprehensive

information for every Medicare- or Medicaid-certified nursing home facility in the U.S.
It provides information on the operational characteristics of each facility along with
aggregate statistics on its residents. The CASPER data were merged at the facility-level
with the NHC data, which provides information on the quality of care at the nursing
home, as reported by CMS.
Because our interest centers on the effects of competition between nursing homes,
home care agencies, and assisted living facilities, nursing homes that were only certified
as a skilled nursing facility (SNF) were dropped from the sample of facilities to be
analyzed. The care provided by SNF-only facilities is much more intense nursing care,
and arguably is not a substitute for the intermediate-level care provided by home care
agencies and assisted living facilities.
Several variables such as the staffing level per bed, the total number of health
deficiencies, the percentage of empty beds in the county, a Herfindahl index, and casemix measurement were all calculated for each facility using the data sets listed above.
The staffing level was calculated as full-time-equivalent staff per bed, defined as the sum
of full-time staff, part-time staff (upon conversion into full-time-equivalent persons), and
contract staff (upon conversion into full-time-equivalent persons). The percentage of
empty beds was derived from the difference between the total number of resident and
total number of certified nursing home beds for each facility as a percentage of the total
number of beds, and then averaged at the county level where the nursing home was
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located. The Herfindahl index was calculated at the county-level and is based on each
facility’s share of beds, defined as the number of beds in that nursing home divided by
the total number of beds in that facility’s county.
Data from the Provider of Service file, which provides information on all certified
health care institutional providers across the U.S., and the assisted living facility supply
data collected by Stevenson and Grabowski were merged with the nursing home facility
file based on each nursing home’s zip code.

The assisted living data collected by

Stevenson and Grabowski describes assisted living facilities across the entire U.S., as of
2007. Before merging their data with the 2010 nursing home file, their variables were
each adjusted to reflect 2010 levels, based on the aggregate growth rate in assisted living
facilities, as reported by the AARP report on Assisted Living and Residential Care in the
States in 2010. Data from the ARF were likewise merged to the nursing home file based
on the county.

Variables merged from the ARF were county-specific demographic

characteristics, including per capita income, race, gender, the poverty rate, the mortality
rate, and a region identifier.
The MetLife Market Survey was collected by the MetLife Mature Market
Institute. It contains daily private-pay price levels for nursing homes, monthly rates for
assisted living facilities, hourly rates for home health care agencies, and daily prices for
adult day services. The private rates are mainly state-level average rates, with some
metropolitan areas reported as well. Using state-level price information instead of
recording it at facility level could help avoid the endogeneity problem between price and
quality, thus the state average private price levels were merged with the other previous
mentioned data sets to provide private-pay rates for each long-term care facility.
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Data on state regulations covering long-term care facilities were also added to the
nursing home file. Most of the variables describing nursing home and assisted living
facility regulation take the form of (0,1) indicators. These variables were derived from
information reported in the State Data Book on Long Term Care (2007) Program and
Market Characteristics (funded by the U.S Department of Housing and Urban
Development) and the Assisted Living State Regulatory Review (2007) (prepared by the
National Center for Assisted Living).
According to the State Date Book on Long Term Care, there are four types of
rate-setting systems for nursing homes, including prospectively set, flat rate, case-mix
based, and combination-type systems. The strictest is a flat rate system because it sets a
uniform level of reimbursement for the same class of homes, regardless of their variation
in costs. In contrast, a case-mix based system adjusts a nursing home’s rate based on its
residents’ case-mix, which reflects differences in need. Under a prospective rate system
a nursing home’s reimbursement rate is set in advance, based on the previous costs level
of each facility, but it doesn’t account for the actual costs. A combination system has
both prospective and retrospective elements to how rates are set, so that interim rates
eventually align closer to actual costs. Since only one state has a flat rate system and one
state has a case-mix based system, this analysis could control for only the prospective and
combination systems in the regression models estimated.
State rate-setting systems for assisted living facilities can likewise be categorized
according to the type of system. In 2010 there were five different approaches seen across
the different states: a flat rate system, a tiered rate system, a case-mix based rate, a feefor-service (FFS) based rate, and a negotiated rate system. A flat rate system for assisted
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living facilities, just like a flat rate system for nursing homes, does not allow any
adjustments for conditional differences across assisted living facilities. Rather, each
facility receives the same flat rate. A case-mix based system has the same basic logic as
a case-mix reimbursement system for nursing homes. A tiered rate system is quite
similar to a case-mix based system, except it typically has fewer rate categories than a
case-mix based system. Under a fee-for-service rate setting scheme, instead of receiving
a monthly payment, the assisted living facility has to send bill to the payment agency
based on the services delivered to the resident. Finally, a negotiated rate system is a
method that combines some or all features of the other four systems.
In addition to their rate-setting system, the analysis controls for several other
aspects of state regulation of assisted living facilities. "Assisted living CON" measures
whether the state has a CON program in effect for assisted living facilities. "AL scope of
care" indicates whether the facility could provide skilled nursing services to residents.
"AL Medicaid Waiver" and "state plan" measure whether the state allows Medicaid to
cover the costs of assisted living services through a Medicaid Waiver program or state
plan.
Table 3.1 describes all of the variables used in the analysis and their sources.

3.4 Econometric Framework
3.4.1 Market Definition
Following previous studies I define the local market as the county where the
nursing home is located (Nyman 1985, Gertler 1992, Cohen and Spector 1996,
Grabowski and Hirth 2003). Thus, we presume that competition among long term care
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providers takes place mainly in the facility’s county and not outside it. Nyman (1994)
found 80% of residents in Wisconsin facilities chose a nursing home located in the
county in which they resided before entering the home, and Gertler (1989) found 75% of
nursing home residents in New York state were likewise from the same county where
their facility was located. Thus, although not perfect, the county may be a reasonable
proxy for the relevant market.
3.4.2 Explanatory Variables in the Models
The presence of local excess demand for nursing home placement can affect
competition among suppliers. When there is a bed constraint in the supply of nursing
home care, theory suggests that private-pay consumer will be satisfied first because of
their higher pay rates. Remaining beds will then be filled with Medicaid eligibles. Thus,
“excess-demanders” are typically Medicaid eligibles. Excess demand in a market can
affect care quality. As long as quality is higher than the minimum required level, nursing
home beds will be filled by Medicaid eligibles. In effect, individuals on Medicaid lose
their right to choose a nursing home based on its quality; instead they are simply waitlisted for the first facility where an available bed opens up. This reduces the willingness
of nursing homes to provide better quality and to compete based on quality. An increase
in the Medicaid rate may even have the reverse effect on nursing home quality. The
present analysis will control for local excess demand in analyzing the determinants of
nursing home quality. The county-wide average percentage of empty beds in nursing
homes is used as a proxy for excess demand.
Nursing home care quality is multidimensional.

Measures fall into three

categories: structural or input-based measures, process-of-care measures, and outcome-
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related measures. Structural measures are organizational characteristics of the nursing
home, and include staffing levels as well as the scope of the nursing home’s healthrelated deficiencies, such as the number of federal minimum quality standards the facility
fails to fulfill. Process measures include the prevalence of indwelling catheters among
the facility’s residents, the prevalence of tube feeding, the prevalence of physical
restraints, and the facility’s drug error rate. In general, process measures depend on and
reflect the interactions occurring between the nursing home’s staff and its residents.
Outcome measures, such as the prevalence of pressure sores in the nursing home, are
widely regarded as the most straightforward measures of care quality.

Outcome

measures represent changes in resident characteristics directly attributable to the practice
and environment of the nursing home.
In this analysis measures from all three categories are used. Table 3.2 lists the
nine variables in the analysis that measure care quality and their type.

Although

registered nurses (RN) per bed, licensed practical nurses (LPN) per bed, and nurse aids
per bed are all measures of staffing levels, these different types of nursing staff should
not be regarded as perfect substitutes. RNs have the broadest scope-of-practice under
state licensure regulations, have more medical training, and in any nursing home they
provide the more intensive and skilled nursing services. LPNs focus more on daily
medical routines that help preserve a resident’s well being. The all-day-round care
provided by nurse aids can possibly affect a resident’s satisfaction and his/her mood. To
acknowledge these differences in roles, all three are used as quality indicators in the
analysis. Measurements of catheter and pressure sores are adjusted for pre-existing
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conditions where the prevalence is recorded as percentage of residents who did not have
but acquired catheter or pressure sore during the stay in nursing home facilities.
The models to be estimated also control for the case mix of residents because this
too may affect quality. Residents who are more disabled generally require higher levels
of care, and they tend to preform worse on outcome-based measures of quality. The
Management Minutes system designed by Bill Thoms (1975) is used to adjust this bias. It
is expressed in minutes of staffs' time where different prevalence of disability is given
different weight based on the level of sickness. The indicators of disabilities are mutually
exclusive and expressed in term of percentage of residents. In order to avoid
multicolinearity in the statistical analysis, any quality indicator that is embodied in the
case-mix system is abandoned from the group of dependant variables.
The case mix index was calculated as follows:
Case-Mix Index = A(20) + B(18) + C(30) + D(30) + E(20) + F(48) + G(90) +
H(90) + I(45) + J(32) + K(20) + L(50) + M(36)
where A through M are: (A) the percentage of residents needing full assistance
bathing, (B) the percentage needing partial assistance bathing, (C) the percentage needing
full assistance dressing, (D) the percentage needing partial assistance dressing, (E) the
percentage who are catheterized, (F) the percentage who are incontinent, (G) the
percentage needing parenteral feeding, (H) the percentage needing tube feeding, (I) the
percentage needing assistance eating, (J) the percentage who are nonambulatory, (K) the
percentage with pressure sores, (L) the percentage receiving bowel/bladder retraining,
and (M) the percentage receiving special skin care.
3.4.3 Model Specification
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Linear regression models are adopted, one for each measure of nursing home
quality. Because of the possible correlation between long-term care regulation policies
and the market supply of nursing home, home care, and assisted living facility, a
Hausman test is used to check for the endogenous of nursing home beds, per capita home
care agencies, and per capita assisted living beds. The results ruled out the possible
endogeneity of nursing home beds and home care agency, but failed to reject the
possibility of endogeneity of per capita assisted living beds in the county. To address this
issue, all of the quality models were estimated via two-stage least squares (2SLS). State
regulations specific to assisted living facilities are good candidates for instrumental
variables, as they are expected to influence assisted living facilities but should not affect
nursing home outcomes. In this study state regulations regarding assisted living facility's
allowed scope of care, reimbursement methods, and whether there was a Medicaid waiver
in place allowing for coverage in such facilities were used as instruments in the first stage
of estimation.
However, some other policy variables such as assisted living private-pay price
level and assisted living Certificate of Need regulation might be correlated with the
nursing home quality indicators as well. These variables are left out of the first-stage
regression and are instead used as additional independent variables in the second stage
regression.
Equation (1) below describes the basic linear regression model for care quality.
Qim measures the care quality of nursing home i in market m. Xim is a vector of facility
characteristics for nursing home i in market m. S m is a vector of measures of competition
and private price from nursing homes, assisted living facilities, and home care agencies in
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market m. Zm is a vector of the demographics of the local population, measured at the
county-level. Finally, RmNHAL is a vector of variables measuring nursing home state
regulations and AL CON.
Qim = β1Xim + β2SmNH + β3SmHC + β4SmAL + β5Zm + β6RmNHAL + εim

(1)

Because of the endogeneity of the assisted living beds per capita, the actual
regression model is estimated using 2SLS, with instrument variables to address the
endogeneity of assisted living beds per capita. In the first stage, the equation estimated is:
SmAL = β1Xim + β2SmNH + β3SmHC + β4Zm + β5RmNH + β6RmAL + εm

(2)

where SmAL is endogenous, and the vector, RmAL , is a set of instrumental variables
describing state regulation of assisted living facilities other than AL CON. In the second
stage, the equation estimated is:
Qim = β1Xim + β2SmNH + β3SmHC + β4ŜmAL + β5Zm + β6RmNHAL + εim

(3)

where ŜmAL is a vector of predicted values for SmAL that are estimated from equation (2).

3.5 Results
Table 3.3 reports the mean and standard deviations for variables used in the
analysis.
As noted earlier, the nine quality indicators examined all three types of quality
measure, i.e., input-based, process-based, and outcome-based measures. The first three
measure staffing levels, and are each computed as number of nursing staff per 1000
nursing home beds. This scale is used for the convenience of presenting coefficients. As
an input factor for residents’ health conditions, an increase in the staffing level per bed
indicates a better nursing home quality. The other six quality indicators measure the
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deficiencies in health service, care procedures, and health outcomes, and they are
negative indicators of care quality. For example, the higher the percentage of residents
who have facility-acquired pressure sores, the lower the quality of care in the nursing
home. A positive relationship of an independent variable with a positive quality indicator
means that an increase in that variable increases quality, whereas a positive relationship
with a negative quality indicator means that an increase in that independent variable
decreases quality.
County-level demographic characteristics include county per capita income, the
percentage of females in the adult population, the percentage of the population ages 65
and older, the mortality rate, the poverty rate, and whether the county is urban or rural.
County per capita income is included to measure ability to pay for long term care in the
county. The percentage of adult females is a proxy for the availability of informal care
provided by family members. Since women are the major caregivers in families this is
likely a good proxy. Whether a certain county is located in a metropolitan area is
included because previous studies have found this to be predictive of quality.
Four variables measure the market’s structure and competition from outside and
within the nursing home sector. Competition from assisted living is represented by the
number of assisted living facility beds per capita in the county.

This measure is

preferable to the number of assisted living facilities per capita for two reasons. First, the
size of assisted living facilities varies tremendously, e.g., a single facility may have 5 or
500 beds. Thus, simply using the number of facilities would fail to capture the true
availability of beds outside of nursing homes. Second, compared to the number of
assisted living facilities, the number of beds is more likely to affect the overall demand
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for nursing home placements. With regard to the home health agencies, whose services
are not generally counted in terms of beds, the number of home care agencies per capita
in the county is used as a proxy for competition from the home health care sector.
Competition from other nursing homes is measured by the Herfindahl index (HHI) of
nursing home bed share in each county. The competition index used in this regression is
adjusted by 1 minus the actual Herfindahl index. After the alternation, a higher adjusted
HHI value indicates more competition within the nursing home sector.
Table 3.4 reports key findings from the 2SLS regressions estimated for all nine
quality measures. The full regression models, which control for all of the variables
shown in the data summary, are included in the appendix B.
Just as anticipated, nursing home quality is affected by local competition from
assisted living facilities and home care agencies. As shown in Table 3.4, increased
competition from home care agencies has significant effects on seven out of the nine
quality indicators. Competition was mainly focused in the labor market where both home
care agencies and nursing homes are trying to get more professional nursing staff. The
marginal effect of one unit increase in the home care agency per capita would lead to a
decrease of 6943.63 nurse aides for 1000 nursing home beds. However, the competition
from home care agencies doesn’t bring down nursing home quality measured by number
of health deficiencies, percentage physically restrained resident, percentage with facility
acquired catheters and drug error rate. Increased competition from assisted living
facilities also has significant effects on nursing home quality. These effects will be
analyzed with assisted living regulations coefficients in Table 3.5 in more detail.
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These results show the importance of controlling for the long-term care market
competition when analyzing the policy effects on nursing home quality. Estimation in an
isolated market is biased and far from the reality.
After controlling for excess demand and local competition from all three types of
long-term care providers, the Medicaid reimbursement rate is positively and significantly
associated with nursing home quality. A one dollar increase in the reimbursement rate
leads to an increase of 0.12 RNs per 1000 beds, 0.578 LPNs per 1000 beds, and 0.571
nurse aids per 1000 beds. An increase in the Medicaid reimbursement rate also has
uniformly positive and significant effects on process-based and outcome-based measures
of quality. Raising the Medicaid price by one dollar decreases the number of healthrelated deficiencies by 0.159, the drug error rate by 0.006 percent, the prevalence of
antipsychotic medications by 0.017 percent, and the prevalence of catheters by 0.004
percent. Although these effects are small, they are all statistically significant.
These results imply that the excess demand hypothesis, which states that nursing
home quality and Medicaid rate will change counter-intuitively, does not apply to the
market conditions of 2010, for which these models are estimated. This may be due to the
growth in other forms of long-term care services. Medicaid residents as well as the
private residents become limited resources that all sectors are competing with each other
in terms of quality. A higher price level will lead directly to higher quality as suggested
by economics theories. Any factor that will decrease the Medicaid price level will reduce
the nursing home quality.
The effects of CON regulation on nursing home quality are mixed.

CON

regulations significantly raise nurse staffing levels. One interpretation is that, to the
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extent that CON regulations lower available nursing home beds, nursing homes
compensate by staffing more intensely. However, their more-intense staffing does not
bring up the quality in nursing homes. Instead, nursing homes located in states with CON
have, on average, four more health deficiencies and 0.58% more residents who are
physically restrained, compared to nursing homes in non-CON states. This finding
suggests that CON may improve staffing inputs, but this improvement dose not lead to a
further increase in nursing home quality, at least according to process-based and
outcome-based measures. Regulatory agencies should try to protect the quality level of
nursing homes first before reducing nursing home beds.
Studies that examined the effects of Medicaid reimbursement methods, not just
the level of the Medicaid rate, such as Cohen and Dubay (1990) and Grabowski (2001),
found that stricter, flat-rate methods tend to have more negative effects on staffing levels,
and fewer positive effects on other measures of quality. Prospective rate-setting methods
are the strictest compared to combination systems in this paper, and the regression results
are consistent with the previous literature. Both systems have positive effects on staffing
levels, as measured by LPNs per 1000 beds and nurses aids per 1000 beds. These two
rate-setting methods also appear to significantly reduce the prevalence of health
deficiencies and pressure sores. Regarding other process-based quality measures, such as
the prevalence of physical restraints and antipsychotic medications, the prospective ratesetting methods cause a rise in the prevalence of both conditions. In contrast, the
coefficients are not statistically significant for combination systems.
Rate-setting systems that adjust for a nursing home’s case mix appear to have
mixed effects on quality. They increase LPN staffing levels, while decreasing RN and
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nurse aid staffing levels.

They also appear to reduce the drug error rate and the

prevalence of physical restraints, but increase the prevalence of antipsychotic
medications and catheters. Their effect on the prevalence of pressure sores is negative as
well.
The effects of state regulations regarding assisted living facilities on care quality
in nursing homes are reported in Tables 3.5 and 3.6. The direct effect is from the AL
CON regulation and AL beds per capita. The indirect effects are from the AL regulation
factors onto the AL beds supply, which is a direct competition factor to nursing home
quality, then further associated with quality level provided in nursing homes.
As far as its direct impact on quality, competition from assisted living facility,
which is measured by number of beds per capita in each county, has mixed effects on
nursing home quality. It improves the staffing level quality indicators, while it reduces
quality indicated by process measurements.
The positive effects on the staffing level can be explained by the different in care
level the two kinds of facilities provide. Residents in assisted living facility, referred to as
“low-care” patients by Mor et al (2007), generally have better health conditions and
require less services than the ones in nursing homes. As a result, there will be more staffs
needed and hired in counties where competition from assisted living facilities have
attracted the "low-care" residents and left nursing homes with "high-care" residents.
Furthermore, this condition also helps explain the negative effects on resident outcome.
Because the "high-care" residents generally have high level of disabilities, their measured
health conditions will be lower as well. Overall, factors including number of health
deficiencies, percentage physically restrained, percentage catheters, and drug error rate
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are more severe in places with higher number of assisted living beds per capita. For
example, when the assisted living beds per capita increases by 1, it will increase health
deficiencies in nursing homes by 123.72, drug error rate by 4.24%, percentage physically
restrained by 6.32%, and percentage acquired catheters by 3.68%.
Because of the negative effects of assisted living competition on nursing home
quality, a factor that controls the competition from assisted living facilities, such as the
assisted living CON, will generally increase nursing home quality. Nursing homes
operate in state with assisted living CON will have 9 less health deficiencies than homes
operate in states that do not control the growth speed of assisted living facilities. There
will also be 0.49% less physically restrained, 0.58% less antipsychotic and 0.15% less
catheters in those nursing facilities.
The effects of other AL regulation policies on AL beds from the first step
regression are listed in Table 3.6. When states allow assisted living facilities to provide
skilled nursing care, the AL bed supply in that state will be higher by 0.024 beds per
capita. Although the bed supply is not significantly higher in states allowing Medicaid
waiver to pay for the AL services, it is higher when there is state plan to cover the costs.
The coefficient of the flat rate reimbursement method on AL beds per capita is -0.051,
with similar effects from other methods of payments. All kinds of the AL reimbursement
methods are associated with the bed supply negatively, except for the most generous FFS
reimbursement. This might because of the fact that Medicaid generally pay lower than the
private insurance. In states where Medicaid can be used to pay for assisted living costs,
there will be more residents using Medicaid instead of private long-term care insurance in
the facilities. According to Stevenson et al (2010) assisted living facilities distribute
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disproportionally in areas where there are more private-paying residents. So no matter
which kind of payment the Medicaid reimbursement system uses, the assisted living bed
supply will be lower.
Using the chain rule (i.e., dy/dz = dy/dx*dx/dz) we see that the indirect effect of
assisted living regulations on nursing home quality can be derived as the product of their
marginal effect on AL beds and the marginal effect of AL beds on care quality. The
cross products are shown only for the variables with significant coefficients at both steps.
Variables which have positive effects on the growth of assisted living facilities are
now negatively associated with nursing home quality. Application of the chain rule
implies that in states that allow nursing care to be provided in AL facilities and which
also cover Medicaid services using state plans, there will be about 6 less LPNs per bed in
nursing homes, 3 more health deficiencies occurring in nursing homes, a 0.10% increase
in the drug error rate, a 0.15% increase in the prevalence of physical restraints, and a
0.09% increase in the prevalence of catheters.
On the other hand, the reimbursement methods have positive effects on nursing
home process-based and outcome-based quality measures. For example, the total number
of health deficiencies is reduced by about 4.08 to 8.78, the drug error rate is reduced by
0.14% to 0.30%, the prevalence of physical restraints is reduced by 0.21% to 0.45, and
the prevalence of catheters is reduced by 0.12% to 0.26%. The AL case-mix
reimbursement method has the highest magnitude in affecting the nursing home quality
among all the other systems.

3.6 Conclusions
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The market for long-term care and the nature of competition among suppliers has
evolved over the last two decades. Assisted living facilities and home care agencies are
far more prevalent nowadays compared to 1990, and these providers compete with
nursing homes to provide services to individuals who are higher-functioning, e.g., who
need assistance with a few activities of daily living but not continuous, 24-hour support.
With the exception of Bowblis (2012), existing empirical studies of the determinants of
nursing home quality have generally assumed that nursing homes only compete with
other nursing homes and not with other types of firms providing substitutes for nursing
home care, at least among higher-functioning, less disabled individuals. This paper has
examined the effects of state regulation of long-term care providers on care quality in
nursing home, controlling for the local competition effects from other long-term care
providers. From this nationally representative analysis of data on 13,436 nursing homes,
all observed in 2010, three key findings emerge.
First, a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate leads to definite improvements in
care quality in nursing homes. This statement applies to nine different quality measures,
including input-based, process-based, and outcome-based indicators.

Given the

widespread presence of assisted living facilities and home care agencies, which for some
patients are feasible alternatives to nursing homes, a presumption that excess demand
gives rise to a negative relationship between Medicaid reimbursement rates and nursing
home quality just isn’t plausible anymore. An increase in the Medicaid daily rate leads to
significant increases in a nursing home’s RNs, LPNs, and nurses aids per bed, and
significant decreases in a home’s total number of health deficiencies, the occurrence of
medication errors, the prevalence of antipsychotic medications, and the prevalence of
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catheters.

The method used by a state for setting Medicaid rates also has quality

repercusions.

Prospective rate setting systems and combination systems raise some

aspects of care quality in nursing homes, at least compared to flat-rate systems.
Second, the presence of nursing home CON regulations also has positive effects
on nursing home staffing levels. However, other measures, such as process-based and
outcome-based quality indicators respond negatively to the presence of CON.

One

interpretation is that, faced with a bed constraint, nursing homes are substituting labor for
capital, but such substitution does not raise care quality when measured via any nonstaffing measure.
Finally, care quality in nursing homes also responds significantly to local market
competition from assisted living facilities and home care agencies, not just from other
nearby nursing homes. Nursing homes are no longer an isolated long-term care sector,
and their care quality reflects that. This study found that competition from home care
agencies has mixed effects on nursing home quality. Its effects on staff-to-bed ratios were
mostly negative, whereas its effects on other structure, process, and outcome quality
measures were mostly positive. The presence of local competition from assisted living
facilities has mixed but mostly negative effects on care quality. For example, more
assisted living beds in a nursing home’s market improves the home’s staffing levels, but
increases its number of health deficiencies, the prevalence of medication errors, physical
restraints, and catheters among residents.
Related to this, state CON programs for assisted living facilities, which in effect
constrain competition from assisted living facilities, generally raise care quality in
nursing homes.

In states with such programs nursing homes incur fewer health
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deficiencies, and they have lower rates of physical restraints, antipsychotic medications,
and catheter use among their residents. Additionally, when states allow assisted living
facilities to provide skilled nursing care, nursing homes lower nurse staffing levels, but at
the same time they incur more health deficiencies and have a higher prevalence of
medication errors, physical restraints, and catheters among residents. Similar findings
occurred in states that cover long-term care for Medicaid residents in assisted living
facilities.
The main policy implication of this study is that Medicaid regulations have
significant effects on nursing home quality. Like Grabowski (2001), this study finds
strong evidence that lower Medicaid reimbursement rates decrease nursing home quality,
regardless of how it is measured. Further, this fundamental result holds even when
quality models control for competition from home care agencies and assisted living
facilities.

When a state reduces its payment rate, nursing homes sacrifice quality to

make ends meet. State CON programs also tend to lower quality. Although CON
programs save on Medicaid outlays, they end up hurting all nursing home residents,
whose wellbeing is reduced by lower quality care. Governments need to weigh these
costs against the benefits before implementing CON. The methods for setting Medicaid
rates also matter. In particular, methods that adjust for actual costs, such as retrospective
rate-setting systems, have an advantage over other approaches, in that they improve
nursing home quality.
As far as the interaction between nursing home quality and assisted living
regulation, policies that restraint the growth of assisted living facilities will raise nursing
home quality. However, this does not mean states should impede the growth of the
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assisted living sector. Policy makers need to take into account changes in residents’
characteristic and quality of services of nursing homes after the rapid growth of home and
community based services when they set the reimbursement level of nursing homes.
Building a segmented market may be useful in establishing state regulations and
improving efficiency.
However, based on the nature of the analyzing model, we cannot rule out the
possibility of some third factor that is correlated with the policy factors and nursing home
quality in longitudinal settings. Further research needs to be done using panel data of the
whole long-term care market.
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Tables for Chapter 3:
Table 3.1 Variable Descriptions
Variable

Definition

Source

RN/Beds

Total number of registered nurses per beds in each nursing
facility

CASPER

LPN/Beds

Total number of licensed practical nurses per beds in each
nursing facility

CASPER

Nurse Aides/Beds

Total number of Nurse Aides per beds in each nursing
facility

CASPER

Health Deficiencies

Number of regulatory health deficiencies in each nursing
facility

NHC

Drug Error Rate

Percentage of drug error in each facility

CASPER

Percentage Physically
Restrained

Percentage of resident in each facility who are physically
restrained

CASPER

Percentage
Antipsychotic

Percentage of resident in each facility who use antipsychotic
medication

CASPER

Percentage Acquired
Catheters

Percentage of resident in each facility who acquired catheter
during the stay

CASPER

Percentage Acquired
Pressure Sores

Percentage of resident in each facility who are acquired
pressure sore during the stay

CASPER

Quality Measures

Nursing Home Facility Characteristics
NH Beds Per Capita

Nursing home total beds per capita for each facility

CASPER

NH Ownership

Dummy variable if Government owned=1; 0=otherwise

CASPER

For/Non- Profit

Dummy variable For-profit=1; Non-profit=0

CASPER

Provider Based Facility

Dummy variable =1 if provider based; 0=otherwise

CASPER

Percentage Medicaid
Residents

Percentage of Medicaid residents in each facility

CASPER

Special Care Beds

Percentage of nursing home beds for Alzheimer patients

CASPER

Case-Mix Index

Case mix measurement for each facility

CASPER

Market Structure
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NH Avg Empty Beds

Average percentage of nursing home empty beds in county

CASPER

HC Agency Per Capita

Number of home care agencies per capita in county

POS

AL Beds Per Capita

Number of assisted living beds per capita in county

Stevensen 2010

NH Herfindahl Index

Nursing home Herfindahl Index in each county

CASPER

County Demographic Characteristics
Census Region Code

1=Northeast 2=Midwest 3=South 4=West

ARF

County Per Capita
Income

Per capita income in each county

ARF

Population 65+

Percentage of population age 65 and over in county

ARF

Adult Female

Percentage of population adult female in county

ARF

Medicaid Eligible

Percentage of Medicaid eligible older adults in 65 and over
age group in each county

ARF

Mortality Rate

County mortality rate

ARF

Poverty Rate

County poverty rate

ARF

Percentage White

Percentage white population in county

ARF

Percentage Black

Percentage black population in county

ARF

Population Density

Population density per square mile in county

ARF

Low Education Type

Dummy variable for low educational region

ARF

NH Medicaid Price

Nursing home Medicaid per diem price

State Data Book

NH CON

Dummy variable for state nursing home CON regulation

State Data Book

NH Prospective
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for prospective reimbursement system

State Data Book

NH Combination
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for combination reimbursement system

State Data Book

NH Case-Mix Adjusters

Dummy variable of whether the reimbursement rate is
adjusted for case-mix

State Data Book

NH Price Ratio

Nursing home Medicaid reimbursement rate over nursing
home private pay price

MetLife Market
Survey

AL Daily Avg Price

Assisted living facility private-pay daily average price

MetLife Market

State Policy Factors
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Survey
HC hourly Avg Price

Home health care agency private-pay hourly average price

MetLife Market
Survey

Adult Day Care Daily
Avg Price

Adult day care facility private-pay daily average price

MetLife Market
Survey

AL CON

Dummy variable for state assisted living Certificates of
Need regulation

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Facility Scope of
Care

Dummy variable of whether the assisted living facility could
provide nursing services

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Medicaid Waiver

Dummy variable of whether the state Medicaid waiver could
cover assisted living costs

AL Regulatory
Review

AL State Plan

Dummy variable of whether there is a state plan to cover
assisted living costs

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Flat Rate
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for flat rate reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Tiered Rate
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for tiered rate reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Case-Mix
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for case-mix reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review

AL FFS Reimbursement

Dummy variable for fee-for-service reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review

AL Negotiated
Reimbursement

Dummy variable for negotiated reimbursement system

AL Regulatory
Review
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Table 3.2 Type of Quality Indicators
Quality Indicator

Type of Indicator

RN/Bed

Structure

LPN/Bed

Structure

Nurse Aids/Bed

Structure

Health Deficiency

Structure

Drug Error Rate

Process

Percentage Physically Restrained

Process

Percentage Antipsychotic

Process

Percentage Acquire Catheters

Process

Percentage Acquire Pressure Sores

Outcome
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Table 3.3 Descriptive Statistics of All Variables
Total observation number: 13426
Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

RN/Beds

0.07169

0.08586

LPN/Beds

0.135396

0.126905

Nurse Aides/Beds

0.378815

0.185241

Health Deficiencies

14.98494

11.32956

Drug Error Rate

1.504207

4.067297

Percentage Physically Restrained

3.11389

5.58665

Percentage Antipsychotic

25.19481

14.81464

Percentage Acquire Catheters

1.623429

2.80799

Percentage Acquire Pressure Sores

2.941331

3.245092

NH Beds Per Capita

0.165465

0.148378

NH Ownership

0.761367

0.426264

For/Non- Profit

0.705123

0.456005

Provider Based Facility

0.048494

0.214816

Percentage Medicaid Residents

62.89192

19.74553

Special Care Beds

4.987203

13.21166

Case-Mix Index

141.9866

43.93583

NH Avg Empty Beds

17.34904

10.53505

HC Agency Per Capita

0.036434

0.057068

AL Beds Per Capita

0.311181

0.221559

Herfindahl Index (1-HHI)

0.7740254

0.2565023

Census Region Code

2.461169

0.946563

County Per Capita Income (in 1000s)

1.722276

0.721113

Population 65+

14.08715

3.631144

Adult Female

30.0873

2.268431

72
Variables

Mean

Std. Dev.

Medicaid eligible

15.28146

7.763679

Mortality Rate

0.904158

0.23473

Poverty Rate

15.58205

5.318782

Percentage White

77.39127

16.67342

Percentage Black

11.00004

12.85455

Population Density (in1000s)

1.244913

4.045115

Low Education Type

0.121789

0.327054

NH Medicaid Per Diem Price

142.3166

37.54888

NH CON

0.773915

0.41831

NH Prospective Reimbursement

0.849497

0.357577

NH Combination Reimbursement

0.136091

0.342898

NH Case-Mix Adjusters

0.677738

0.46736

NH Price Ratio

132.4298

68.02018

AL Daily Avg Price

107.2017

19.53959

HC hourly Avg Price

20.66501

2.799751

Adult Day Care Daily Avg Price

60.38816

17.47155

AL CON

0.156333

0.363184

AL Facility Scope of Care

0.749871

0.434623

AL Medicaid Waiver

0.716859

0.450541

AL State Plan

0.244645

0.487086

AL Flat Rate Reimbursement

0.312043

0.463347

AL Tiered Rate Reimbursement

0.432814

0.495487

AL Case-Mix Reimbursement

0.14892

0.356025

AL FFS Reimbursement

0.070242

0.255565

AL Negotiated Reimbursement

0.035982

0.186253
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Table 3.4 Two-stage Least Square Regression Model on Nursing Home Quality Indicators:
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Table 3.5 Second-stage Regression and Cross-product Coefficients:

75
Table 3.6 First-stage Regression on Assisted Living Beds Per Capita:

76
APPENDIX A
APPENDIX FOR CHAPTER 2
Case-mix based on Grabowski (2001) is calculated as follows:
A(20) + B(18) + C(30) + D(30) + E(20) + F(48) + G(90) + H(90) + I(45) + J(32) + K(20)
+ L(50) + M(36)
A=% of residents need full assistance bathing
B=% of residents need partial assistance bathing
C=% of residents need full assistance dressing
D=% of residents need partial assistance dressing
E=% of residents catheterized
F=% of residents incontinent
G=% of residents need parenteral feeding
H=% of residents need tube feeding
I=% of residents need assistance eating
J=% of residents nonambulatory
K=% of residents with pressure sores
L=% of residents receive bowel/bladder retraining
M=% of residents receive special skin care
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APPENDIX B
FULL REGRESSION FOR CHAPTER 2
1. 2SLS QUALITY REGRESSION:
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APPENDIX C
FULL REGRESSION FOR CHAPTER 3
1. 2SLS QUALITY REGRESSION
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84
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2. FIRST STAGE REGRESSION
AL Beds Per Capita

Coef.

Std. Err.

NH Beds Per Capita

6.59951

0.29603

Avg Empty Beds

-0.00033

0.00024

Ownership

-0.01667

0.00952

For/Non- Profit

0.01100

0.00918

Provider Based Facility

0.00564

0.00993

Percentage Medicaid Residents

-0.00014

0.00011

Special Care Beds

0.00013

0.00015

Case Mix

0.00006

0.00005

HC Agencies Per Capita

21.01664

0.15630

***

NH HHI

0.02557

0.01034

***

Census Region Code

0.01502

0.00382

***

County Per Capita Income

-0.00404

0.00466

Population 65+

0.00392

0.00132

***

Adult Female

0.00533

0.00128

***

Percentage Medicaid eligible

0.00177

0.00045

***

Mortality Rate

-0.00481

0.02133

Poverty Rate

-0.00444

0.00071

***

Percentage White

-0.00120

0.00035

***

Percentage Black

-0.00115

0.00039

***

Population Density

-0.00177

0.00065

***

Low Education Type

0.04904

0.00847

***

NH Medicaid Per Diem Price

0.00041

0.00012

***

NH price ratio

-0.00002

0.00006

***

*
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AL daily avg price

0.00014

0.00019

HC hourly avg price

0.00209

0.00127

*

Adult day care daily avg price

0.00043

0.00016

***

NH CON

-0.00796

0.01006

AL CON

-0.01893

0.00858

NH Prospective Reimbursement

0.02046

0.01977

NH Combination Rimbursement

0.02655

0.02018

NH Case-Mix Adjusters

-0.00759

0.00700

AL Facility Scope of Care

0.02435

0.00816

AL Medicaid Waiver

0.00775

0.00724

AL State Plan

0.02511

0.00787

***

AL Flat Rate Reimbursement

-0.05078

0.01415

***

AL Tiered Rate Reimbursement

-0.03278

0.01508

**

AL Case-Mix Reimbursement

-0.07073

0.01580

***

AL FFS Reimbursement

-0.01398

0.01818

AL Negotiated Reimbursement

-0.06289

0.01939

***

Con_

-0.23682

0.07282

***

**

***
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This dissertation examines the factors that will affect nursing home quality of care
using several national data sources on market regulation, county demographic
characteristics, market structural and the characteristics of different types of long-term
care providers in 2010.
The first study examines how nine different measures of nursing home care
quality respond to the greater levels of local market competition from these alternative
providers of long-term care, as well as other nursing homes. Findings reveal that faced
with greater competition from assisted living facilities, nursing homes are left to care for
more disabled, less healthy patients. Although the nursing home’s staff-to-bed ratios rise
in response, other measures of care quality decline, such as more process- and outcomebased measures. Competition from home health agencies likewise has mixed effects on
nursing home care quality, and competition from other nursing homes in a market tends
to decrease care quality. These finding suggest that care quality in nursing homes may
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continue to erode as the market for alternative, community-based long-term care services
expands.
The second study examines the Medicare regulation effects on nursing home
quality controlling for the whole long-term care market competition structure. In many
local markets nursing homes now compete with assisted living facilities for residents, yet
most previous studies of the effects of Medicaid nursing home reimbursement policies on
care quality have analyzed nursing homes in isolation, ignoring the presence of nearby
competitor firms, and how state regulation of assisted living facilities might also affect
care quality in nursing homes. This study uses a richer model specification that accounts
for a much broader range of state long-term care regulations as well as the structure of a
nursing home’s local market. Findings reveal that a higher Medicaid reimbursement rate
leads to significant improvements in nine different aspects of nursing home quality, while
state certificate-of-need programs for nursing homes lead to a decline in several (but not
all) dimensions of it. A large presence of assisted living beds in a local market also tends
to reduce nursing home quality, and state regulations regarding assisted living facilities
indirectly affect nursing home care quality by altering the nature of local market
competition. Overall, these results suggest that state laws related to all long-term care
providers, not just nursing homes, are important determinants of nursing home care
quality.
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